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Teachers’ Salaries in Latin America: 
How Much Are They (Under or Over) Paid?
*
 
This paper documents the extent to which teachers are underpaid vis-à-vis workers in other 
professional and technical occupations in Latin America circa 2007. These labor earnings 
differences, attributed to observable socio-demographic and job characteristics, are 
assessed using a matching methodology (Ñopo, 2008). Teachers’ underpayment is found to 
be stronger than what has been previously reported in the literature, especially among pre-
school and primary teachers. Nonetheless, behind the region averages there is an important 
cross-country heterogeneity. Teachers’ underpayment is more pronounced among males, 
older workers, household heads, part-timers, formal workers, those who work in the private 
sector, and (mostly) among those with complete tertiary education. Two amenities of the 
teaching profession, namely the longer job tenure and the flexible job schedules within the 
year, are also explored. Even after accounting for the possible compensating differentials of 
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1.  Introduction  
Research  shows  that  teacher’s  performance  is  a  critical  factor  to  explain  students’  academic 
success in the school system (Goldhaber and Brewer 1997; Rivkin et al 2005; Darling-Hammond 
2001; Rocoff 2004, OECD 2009; Barber and Mourshed 2007; Clotfelter et. al. 2007; Kukla-Acevedo 
2009). Also, the effectiveness of educational policies and the effect of other inputs depend on the 
quality of the daily work of teachers. Therefore, to improve the quality of education it is essential 
to pay special attention to teachers and to implement policies to attract, motivate and retain the 
most talented individuals in the profession.  
In this context, the analysis of teachers’ salaries is relevant since in many countries, and Latin 
America is no exception, they are often perceived to be lower than those of other professionals. If 
this is the case, low incomes would discourage the best students to choose education major in 
College, with negative effects on the pool of future teachers. These low incomes would damage 
their motivation to teach (OECD 2009; Figlio and Kenny 2006; Ortega 2010, Player 2009, Heutel 
2009, Loeb and Page, 2000) and cause good teachers to leave the profession (Imazeki 2005; Harris 
and Adams, 2007; Scafidi et al 2007). These effects would produce inefficiencies in the educational 
process  and  negative  effects  in  students’  learning.  This  concern  over  teacher  quality  and 
motivation has generated renewed interest in both the sufficiency of teacher pay to recruit and 
retain high quality instructors, and the efficacy of the salary structure (including incentives) to 
motivate teachers’ performance. 
A  series  of  studies  have  analyzed  the  issue  of  teachers’  salaries  in  Latin  America  examining 
whether they are under or over-paid.
1 Most of them use National Household Surveys to estimate 
Mincer wage equations with different control variables, and some studies use the Blinder -Oaxaca 
wage gap decomposition. The results are mixe d, indicating that there is no robust empirical 
evidence  showing that teachers receive  lower/higher salaries than a comparative group of 
workers.  
Psacharopoulos et al. (1996) use data for 12 Latin American countries to compare average wages  
without finding a clear pattern; in some countries teachers’ pay is higher than the comparative 
group and vice versa. Liang (1999) finds that in 11 out of 12 countries analyzed, hourly wages for 
teachers are actually higher than their counterparts’ in the labor force with similar observable 
characteristics. Hernani-Limarino (2005) examines the robustness of conditional wage differentials 
to the methods used and the definition of the comparable group for 17 Latin American countries. 
He concludes that in some countries (i.e. Chile) teachers earn more than the comparable workers; 
in others they receive lower salaries (i.e. Nicaragua), while in others the answer depends on the 
control group and the method used to estimate the wage gap. He also estimates conditional wage 
                                                           
1 There are also several studies addressing this issue for non-Latin American countries, for instance, Taylor (2008), 
Allegretto et al (2008), Podgursky and Tongrut (2006), Harris and Adams (2005), Stoddard (2005) for United States, 
Asadullah (2006) for Bangladesh; Komenan and Grootaert (1990) for Cote D’ Ivoire;  Zymelman and DeStephano (1989) 




differentials for different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution, concluding that teachers 
are over or under-paid depending on their position in such conditional distribution. 
In terms of country studies, Saavedra (2004) finds for Perú that earnings comparisons between 
teachers and other occupations depend on the geographic zone, in Lima teachers earn less than 
comparable workers, while in the rest of the country they enjoy a wage premium. Mizala and 
Romaguera (2005) find for Chile that, once differences in observed characteristics are accounted 
for, teachers’ salaries are similar to those they would receive in other occupations; however, they 
find  relevant  differences  between  men  and  women,  female  teachers  earn  more  than  their 
counterparts, while male teachers earn less than similar workers in other sector of the labor 
market. In Bolivia, Mexico and Guatemala, teachers enjoy a wage premium, explained by the fact 
that they are public workers, i.e., teachers working in the public sector earn higher salaries than 
comparable private sector teachers and similar workers in other occupations (Piras and Savedoff  
1998; Lopez-Acevedo 2004; Rivas and Lavarreda 2008). Furthermore, Herreros et al. (2003) for 
Argentina and Urquiola et al. (2000) for Bolivia show that whether teachers are well paid depends 
on the comparison group, even when differences in observable characteristics are accounted for. 
Conditional  wage  differentials  are  favorable  to  teachers  when  compared  with  all  workers; 
nevertheless, the differentials are not favorable to teachers when compared with workers who 
had completed at least secondary education. 
In sum, the available empirical evidence shows that the sign and the magnitude of the conditional 
wage differential between teachers and other workers crucially depends on the definition of the 
comparison group. Moreover, there is some evidence of intra-country heterogeneity, for instance, 
regarding gender and geography.   
The aim of this paper is to revisit the question of conditional labor earnings differentials between 
teachers  and  other  professionals  and  technicians  in  Latin  America,  but  with  a  renewed 
methodological  approach.  The  extent  to  which  earnings  differentials  can  be  attributed  to 
differences in observable socio-demographic and job characteristics will be assessed with the non-
parametric matching methodology developed in Ñopo (2008). This is an extension of the Blinder-
Oaxaca  (BO)  decomposition  for  which  teachers  and  non-teachers  are  matched  when  showing 
exactly the same combination of observable characteristics. The method does not require any 
estimation  of  earnings  equations  and,  by  construction,  it  allows  a  more  precise  salaries 
comparison for teachers and their counterparts than what the literature has been able to do so 
far. Furthermore, this approach allows us to obtain not only more precise estimates of the average 
wage  gap  between  teachers  and  non-teachers,  but  also  a  comprehensive  exploration  of  its 
distribution. Additionally we explore two amenities that may explain, to a certain extent, lower 
teachers’ earnings in the form of compensating differentials: job tenure and job schedules. While 
the former is claimed to be longer among teachers, especially in the public sector; the latter are 
claimed to be more flexible among teachers (that is, more vacation weeks per year). 
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The results obtained depict a picture in which the extent to which teachers are underpaid is 
stronger than what has been previously reported in the literature, especially for pre-school and 
elementary teachers. Nonetheless, behind the region averages there is an important cross-country 
heterogeneity.  Teachers’  underpayment  is  more  pronounced  among  males,  older  workers, 
household heads, part-timers, informal workers, those who work in the private sector, and among 
those with complete tertiary education. These results are also found after adjusting earnings by 
job-break periods, although the earnings gap in this case is smaller, and if rather than hourly, 
monthly and yearly earnings are used. That is, the amenity of part-time schedules, larger vacations 
periods and more job stability (that in many circumstances could be used as a way of managing 
the family-work trade-off) are compensating lower earnings. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the data sources, our 
approach to harmonize them across countries and some descriptive statistics comparing teachers 
with other workers. In section three we present the empirical analysis of the extent to which pay 
differentials  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  observable  characteristics,  followed  by  a  an 
analysis on job tenure, addressing the differences between workers in the public and private 
sector,  and  the  role  of  job  schedules  on  earnings  gaps.  In  the  fourth  and  final  section  we 
summarize the conclusions. 
 
2.  The Data 
The data sources are household and labor surveys, with national or urban representativeness. 
Table 1 reports the specifics of each data source, including the particular survey name, the year 
and the number of observations, both for the whole data set of the working sample and for the 
school teachers, office workers, and (other) professionals and technicians populations within the 
sample (that is, those who will be part of the analysis in subsequent sections). The data will be 
used considering the expansion factors such that the relative size of each sample proportionally 
corresponds to the size of each country. Outliers for income in the main occupation were dropped 
from the data set. This comprised 0.25% of school teachers, 0.25% of office workers and 1.08% of 











Number of Expanded Number of Expanded Number of Expanded Number of Expanded Number of Expanded
observations observations observations observations observations observations observations observations observations observations
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilio (PNAD) 2008 National 157775 76800000 3829 1870619 1055 494701 16070 7787565 19798 9647079
Chile Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN) 2009 National 82905 6021479 1521 111737 278 31928 4812 480221 8568 1027836
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo (ENEMDU) 2006 National 9147 2404002 522 115693 254 56255 901 246601 1093 293211
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples (EHPM) 2009 National 24299 1961864 518 41415 54 4758 1055 102038 1788 203243
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propositos Multiples (EPHPM) 2007 National 26203 1910929 688 50867 205 14618 897 59120 2807 188640
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2008 National 44373 39900000 35 26909 71 50962 5298 4664039 3323 3015056
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre medicion de Niveles de Vida (EMNV) 2005 National 11024 1652432 377 48401 64 9292 258 52396 592 118800
Panamá Encuesta de Hogares (EH) 2007 National 18843 1269338 395 24953 220 14764 1801 141066 1702 131078
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) 2007 Urban 25432 532842 592 12238 418 9023 3343 72151 2841 61053
400001 132452886 8477 2302832 2619 686301 34435 13605197 42512 14685996 All countries
Country
Full Set
Office Workers/Other Proessionals and Technicians/Teachers (non tertiary) Working Populations*


















From  now  on  we  restrict  our  attention  to  the  school  teachers,  office  workers  and  other 
professionals and technicians within the data sources, which represents 23.6% of the total number 
of workers. From those occupational categories we compare those who declare themselves as 
being teachers with the rest of workers within those categories (the former group represents 2.2% 
and the latter 21.4% of workers). The occupational categories used in each country for teachers 
(devoted to the pre-school, primary and secondary education) and non-teachers, are shown in 
Table 2. University teachers and those with particular specialties (e.g. teachers for students with 
special  needs,  language  instructors,  sports  instructors,  driving  instructors,  and  dance  or  art 
instructors) are not considered for the analysis. They are neither part of the teachers nor the non-
teachers group within this paper. Then, when we refer here to teachers or school teachers, we will 
be referring to the same group: pre-school and elementary teachers, and secondary teachers.  
 
Table 2 
Occupational Codes Included in the Definition of Teachers and Comparison Groups 
 
CIUO codes for teachers* 232 Profesores de la enseñanza secundaria
233 Maestros de nivel superior de la enseñanza primaria y preescolar
331 Maestros de nivel medio de la enseñanza primaria
332 Maestros de nivel medio de la enseñanza preescolar
Brazil 2311 Professores de nível superior na educação infantil
2312 Professores de nível superior do ensino fundamental (primeira à quarta série)
2313 Professores de nível superior no ensino fundamental de quinta à oitava série
2321 Professores do ensino médio
2331 Professores do ensino profissional
2332 Instrutores de ensino profissional
3311 Professores de nível médio na educação infantil
3312 Professores de nível médio no ensino fundamental
3313 Professores de nível médio no ensino profissionalizante
3321 Professores leigos no ensino fundamental
Mexico 1310 Profesores de Preparatorias y equivalentes
1320 Profesores de Enseñanza Secundaria
1330 Profesores de Enseñanza Primaria
1340 Profesores de Enseñanza Preescolar
Panamá 266-278 Profesores de universidades y otros establecimientos de la enseñanza superior
279-290 Profesores de la enseñanza secundaria
291-293 Profesores y maestros de enseñanza primaria
294-297 Profesores y maestros de enseñanza preescolar
Group 2 Profesionales Científicos e Intelectuales
Group 3 Técnicos y profesionales de nivel medio
* Used in Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay
Empleados de Oficina Group 4
CIUO codes for office workers (all 
countries)
Country Code Description
CIUO Codes for other 
professionals and technicians (all 
countries)
 
* Used in Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 7 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for observable characteristics in all countries’ data sets and 
allow us to profile the population groups considered. Data suggests that the panorama of the 
teaching profession is such that teaching is predominantly a female occupation (approximately 
eight  out  of  ten  teachers  are  women)  as  opposed  to  the  other  professional  and  technical 
occupations (where more than half are men). Office workers tend to be substantially younger than 
teachers while the other professionals and technicians show an age-distribution that is similar to 
that of teachers. Among teachers, those in elementary and primary levels are slightly younger than 
those  in  secondary.  Teachers,  especially  secondary  teachers,  are  more  educated  than  other 
professionals and technicians which in turn are more educated than office workers.  
Teachers  tend  to  live  in  households  where  there  is  more  presence  of  kids  (12  years  old  or 
younger), elders (65 years or older) and also presence of another wage earner, not being in most 
of the cases household heads. This gives credence to the idea that the choice of becoming a 
teacher is linked to a choice regarding a lifestyle where having a family and raising kids has special 
importance. A characteristic for which there are important differences between teachers and non-
teachers is on job schedule. While nine out of ten non-teachers declare working full time, it is 
44.65% of teachers who declare working part-time (30 hours or less per week). Teachers declare 
working in more formal conditions than their non-teaching peers, at least regarding access to 
social  security  (which  is  the  proxy-measure  for  formality  adopted  here).  Teachers  are  over 
represented in the public sector: 75.7% of teachers work in the public sector while only 21.6% of 



















Other Professionals and 
Technicians
Other Professionals and 




Secondary Teachers All School Teachers
(1) (2) (3)=(1 & 2) (4) (5) (6)=(4 &5)
Personal Characteristics
Age Groups
24 and under 29.7% 15.2% 22.2% 10.5% 7.9% 9.9%
25 to 34 31.2% 32.4% 31.8% 32.0% 29.7% 31.5%
35 to 44 20.9% 25.3% 23.2% 30.9% 28.2% 30.3%
45 to 54 13.2% 17.9% 15.6% 19.9% 24.9% 21.1%
54 and over 5.0% 9.1% 7.1% 6.7% 9.3% 7.3%
Education Level
None or primary incomplete 5.0% 3.9% 4.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2%
Primary complete or secondary incomplete 20.6% 9.9% 15.0% 3.2% 1.3% 2.8%
Secondary complete or tertiary incomplete 68.4% 69.7% 69.1% 88.6% 75.2% 85.5%
Tertiary complete 5.9% 16.6% 11.5% 7.9% 23.5% 11.5%
Labor Characteristics
By Country
Brazil 57.2% 65.7% 61.6% 81.2% 72.1% 79.1%
Chile 3.5% 7.0% 5.3% 4.9% 4.7% 4.8%
Ecuador 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 5.0% 8.2% 5.8%
El Salvador 0.4% 1.3% 0.9% 2.2% 2.1% 1.5%
Honduras 34.3% 20.5% 27.1% 1.2% 7.4% 2.2%
Mexico 0.4% 0.8% 0.6% 2.1% 1.4% 2.6%
Nicaragua 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 2.2% 1.9%
Panamá 0.7% 1.4% 1.1% 1.8% 0.7% 1.3%
Uruguay 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 1.3% 1.5%
87.1%





















Formality (has social security)
43.8% 55.3% 49.8% 12.4%
12.9% 14.2%
Men (Gender)
Presence of Children (≤12 years) in the Household
Presence of Elder (≥65 years) in the Household
Head of the Household
Presence of Other Household Member with Labor Income
Part time workers (≤30 hours)
35.3%
87.4% 69.4%
70.4% 75.7% Works in the public sector 21.6% 26.2% 24.2% 77.2%
 
Source: Authors’ compilations. 9 
 
Next, Table 4 shows descriptive statistics regarding relative earnings of the comparison groups 
with  respect  to  teachers.  Earnings  are  computed  as  hourly  earnings,  measured  in  terms  of 
purchasing  power  parity  (PPP,  US$,  2000).  Hourly  earnings  for  each  individual  are  computed 
dividing the monthly income by the number of hours worked in a week and multiplied by 4.2 
which is the average number of weeks in a month. Both, the monthly income and the number of 
hours worked per week are considered only for the main occupation so there is no bunching of 
multiple occupations  in  the  computation of  hourly  earnings.
2  Average  school  teachers’  hourly 
earnings have been set equal to 100 for each country.  
Table 4 shows that, on average, teachers earn slightly more than the combined group of other 
professionals and technicians and office workers. When disaggregating the comparison group, 
however, it can be seen that teachers earn less than other professionals and technicians but 
almost 40% more than office workers. When disaggregating the group of teachers it can be seen 
that secondary teachers earn more than their pre-school counterparts, but neither earn more than 
other professionals and technicians. 
Males earn more than females in all groups under analysis. People that live with kids, live with 
elder people, are not household heads, live with other wage earner, work in the informal job 
market, and work in the public sector earn less than those who don’t (although the latter is not 
true  for  secondary  teachers).  Individuals’  earnings  show  a  life  cycle  pattern,  but  this  is  less 
pronounced among teachers. Additionally, more educated professionals earn more than their less 
educated peers. However, this income premium decreases with tertiary educational attainment, 
especially among secondary teachers.   
With the exception of Nicaragua, on average, office workers earn less than teachers. On the other 
hand, with the exception of Honduras, Mexico and El Salvador, other professionals and technicians 
who are not devoted to the teaching profession earn more than teachers. In most countries under 
analysis, El Salvador being the only exception, pre-school and elementary teachers earn less than 
secondary teachers. All in all, the hourly earnings gap is more pronounced in Nicaragua where 
other professionals and technicians earn around 89% more than teachers. However, Nicaragua’s 
working population is small within the sample, so this won’t lead to overestimate the earnings gap 
later  on.  At  the  other  extreme  is  Mexico  where  teachers  earn  almost  22%  more  than  other 
professionals and technicians. 
 
 
                                                           
2 The monthly income corresponds to the monthly earnings received from the main occupation in the month previous to 
the survey. The job schedule is captured with survey questions of the type: “¿Quantas horas trabalhava normalmente 
por semana nesse trabalho? ¿Cuántas horas trabaja efectivamente en su empleo o actividad principal? Señale horas 
semanales, ¿cuántas horas efectivas al día trabajó la semana pasada? ¿Cuántas horas trabajó la semana pasada en la 
ocupación principal? El mes pasado, ¿cuántas horas a la semana trabajó en este negocio o empresa? ¿Cuántas horas por 
semana  trabaja  regularmente  como...?;  ¿Cuántas  horas,  días  y  en  qué  jornada  trabajo  efectivamente  la  semana 
anterior?”. So, it can be inferred that teachers are referring not only to their effective class time but to their whole job 
schedule (including preparation, grading, meeting times and the like). 10 
 
Table 4 
Relative Hourly Earnings 
 
Office Workers
Other Professionals and 
Technicians
Other Professionals and 
Technicians or Office 
Workers
Pre-School and Elementary 
Teachers
Secondary Teachers All School Teachers
(1) (2) (3)=(1 & 2) (4) (5) (6)=(4 &5)
Average Hourly Earninngs 60.25 131.30 97.13 91.16 129.65 100.00
Personal Characteristics
Men 
No 55.86 112.96 82.24 90.33 123.90 96.47
Yes 65.88 146.13 112.15 97.03 140.67 116.71
Age Groups
24 and under 40.07 62.97 48.23 58.87 83.32 63.35
25 to 34 55.92 113.03 86.09 79.90 117.54 88.05
35 to 44 70.60 138.47 109.07 96.63 126.92 103.10
45 to 54 88.11 173.21 138.78 106.53 150.64 118.51
54 and over 90.33 208.18 168.27 124.76 159.61 135.01
Education Level
None or primary incomplete 44.13 57.16 50.04 41.98 32.73 41.90
Primary complete or secondary incomplete 43.87 66.85 51.68 69.80 99.22 72.88
Secondary complete or tertiary incomplete 63.07 131.93 99.12 89.73 125.58 96.96
Tertiary complete 98.41 184.05 162.83 117.77 144.31 130.27
Presence of Children (<12 years) in the Household
No 62.49 138.24 103.21 94.98 135.72 105.53
Yes 57.32 120.42 88.41 86.94 119.92 93.35
Presence of Elders (>65 years) in the Household
No 60.50 132.23 97.61 91.25 130.09 100.16
Yes 58.51 125.20 93.92 90.64 127.04 99.03
Head of Household
No 52.29 105.00 77.11 87.73 118.62 94.03
Yes 74.86 161.39 125.75 99.00 146.06 112.29
Presence of Other Household Member with Labor Income
No 67.60 149.42 112.93 94.12 138.09 104.77
Yes 57.97 124.50 91.71 90.37 127.16 98.69
Labor Characteristics
Part time
No 59.57 121.49 90.57 85.29 114.25 92.38
Yes 69.74 194.93 155.17 98.14 151.83 109.47
Formality
No 49.23 99.80 76.85 61.45 102.57 71.46
Yes 65.12 147.65 106.89 95.46 133.93 104.22
Work in the Public Sector*
No 52.52 138.15 99.63 76.48 146.02 94.98
Yes 87.84 164.74 134.87 95.42 125.95 101.61
By Country
Brazil 59.33 150.42 109.73 90.31 136.65 100.00
Chile 65.57 127.45 107.74 93.98 121.07 100.00
Ecuador 58.41 106.53 84.54 90.91 118.69 100.00
El Salvador 52.82 95.17 81.02 101.27 88.97 100.00
Honduras 48.56 79.77 72.33 99.51 101.69 100.00
Mexico 60.37 78.37 67.44 96.38 101.91 100.00
Nicaragua 118.38 189.44 167.69 96.34 119.04 100.00
Panamá 73.10 109.51 90.64 91.57 114.24 100.00
Uruguay 75.10 121.81 96.51 96.91 104.19 100.00
Relative Hourly Earnings (Base: Average School Teacher Earnings in each Country=100)
 
Source: Authors’ compilations. 11 
 
The descriptive statistics depict a picture in which office workers are clearly different not only than 
other professionals and technicians but also, and more importantly, than school teachers. In other 
pieces of the literature office workers have been part of the analysis, but here, based on  the 
exploration of descriptive statistics outlined above, we restrict the comparison group to that of 
other professional and technicians. In the next section we compute and decompose earnings gaps 
between  teachers  (preschool  and  primary,  and  secondary)  and  other  professionals  and 
technicians.  
 
3.  Results 
3.1 The teaching profession vis-à-vis that of other professionals and technicians 
Table  4  shows  that,  on  average,  other  professionals  and  technicians  earn  31.3%  more  than 
teachers.  However,  as  shown  in  the  previous  section  teachers  and  other  professionals  and 
technicians are strikingly differentiated regarding their socio-demographic composition. Therefore 
is appropriate to think that these differences in observable characteristics play a role explaining 
the earnings differentials. Hence, controlling the earnings gap by observable characteristics must 
provide a better estimation of the underlying earnings gap than only considering the “original 
earnings gap” (the gap without controlling for anything, the 31.3%).  
The  extent  to  which  the  earnings  differential  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  observable 
characteristics is explored next. This analysis is performed using matching comparisons such that 
each teacher is paired with a professional or technician with the same observable characteristics. 
The characteristics are gender, age, education, presence of kids (12 or younger) in the household, 
presence  of elders (65 or  older)  in  the  household,  whether  the  individual  is  the  head of the 
household or not, presence of other wage earners in the household, part-time work, formality, 
and whether the individual works in the public sector. These variables are sequentially added as 
matching variables and the results are reported in Table 5. The decompositions are sequentially 
calculated for other professionals and technicians vis-à-vis that of (i) all school teachers, (ii) pre-
school and elementary teachers, and (iii) secondary school teachers.  
The structure of Table 5 is as follows. Each column corresponds to earnings gap decomposition 
after  matching  on  a  set  of  observable  characteristics.  The  first  column  corresponds  to 
decomposition where only gender is taken into account. That is, each male teacher is compared to 
a male professional or technician and each female teacher to a female professional or technician. 
Moving to the right of the table, each column adds a matching variable such that in the last 
column of the table teachers and other professionals and technicians that are compared have the 
same observable characteristics on the 9 variables. That is, when moving a column to the right on 
Table 5 the comparison gets restricted to individuals with the same observable characteristics, 
adding one characteristic at a time. The lines of the table show the overall earnings gap on the first 
line (the original earnings gap), the four components of the earnings gaps on the second to fifth 12 
 
lines and the two measures of the overlapping supports on the sixth and seventh lines
3. The 
earnings gap that prevails on the restricted situation, in which teachers’ earnings are compared to 
those of non-teachers’ with the same characteristics, is denoted by ∆0 in the table. 
As already mentioned, the pay gap between teachers and other professionals and technicians 
reaches 31.3% of average teachers’ earnings. The first column shows that teachers’ underpayment 
vis-à-vis other professionals and technicians is explained to a certain extent by gender, to the point 
that when controlling for gender, non-teachers earn 27.3% more than teachers (the unexplained 
earnings  gap  ∆0)  as  opposed  to  the  original  31.3%.  When  introducing  age  on  top  of  gender 
characteristics as control variables, the earnings gap reaches 31.3%. When adding education in to 
the analysis (that is, when comparing teachers and non-teachers with the same gender, age and 
education) the earnings gap increases almost 21%. This means that, although teachers are more 
educated  than  other  professionals  and  technicians,  their  higher  schooling  attainment  is  not 
properly rewarded by the labor markets. When adding presence of kids (12 or younger), presence 
of elders (65 or older), whether the individual is the household head or not and presence of other 
wage earner in the household, the situation does not change much. However, after adding part-
time  work  and  formality  the  unexplained  part  of  the  earnings  gaps  increases  14%  and  3.6% 
respectively. Part-time work substantially explains the earnings gap. All in all, when comparing 
teachers and non-teachers with the set of 9 observable characteristics that Table 5 depicts (which 
will be referring ahead as the “full set”), non-teachers earn almost 74.8% more than teachers. 
Comparing pre-school and primary teachers with the same comparison group (other professionals 
and technicians) the gap is higher, 44%. Qualitatively the results are the same: the unexplained 
earnings  gap  between  teachers  and  non-teachers  increases  substantially  after  the  addition of 
education and part-time work. When using the 9 observable characteristic in the matching, the 
unexplained earnings gap reaches 80.1%. For secondary teachers vis-à-vis other professionals and 
technicians the earning gap is 1.3%. It increases to 32.8% after adding education and increases in 
7.4% after adding part-time work. When using the 9 observable characteristic in the matching, 
non-teachers earn almost 62.6% more than teachers.  
The last column of Table 5 adds working in the public sector as a control variable. However, this 
information is not available for Mexico, so the last column reports the results for only 8 countries. 
Although the original earnings gap for these 8 countries is slightly higher (45.1% as opposed to the 
31.3% that has been previously reported for the 9 countries), the inclusion of public sector as a 
control variable reduces the unexplained component of the earnings gap. 
                                                           
3 The matching methodology used in this paper serves to decompose the original earnings gap  into four elements (∆0, 
∆NT, ∆T and ∆X) by matching teachers and non-teachers with the same observable characteristics. As in the traditional 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, ∆0 is the unexplained component of the gap (that share of the earnings gap that cannot 
be attributed to differences in characteristics of the individuals). The other three components correspond to differences 
in observable characteristics between the comparing groups. See Ñopo (2008) for extra methodological details. 13 
 
Table 5 
Earnings Gap Decompositions 
 
Gender + Age + Education
+ Kid(s) in 
the 
Household














All School Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 45.1%
∆0 27.3% 31.3% 51.8% 53.0% 53.3% 54.8% 56.8% 71.2% 74.8% 68.1%
∆NT 0.0% -4.2% -14.1% -16.7% -19.0% -19.1% -19.1% -17.0% -20.2% -2.0%
∆T 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4% -0.4% -1.8% -0.9% -2.9%
∆X 4.0% 4.2% -6.3% -4.7% -2.8% -4.0% -6.0% -21.1% -22.4% -18.1%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 100.0% 90.9% 72.5% 66.0% 61.1% 54.9% 47.7% 40.1% 33.1% 28.5%
% CS All School Teachers 100.0% 99.8% 98.5% 97.1% 95.1% 92.3% 88.2% 77.7% 70.8% 61.5%
Pre-school and Elementary Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 44.0% 59.3%
∆0 39.0% 41.9% 57.3% 59.1% 59.4% 60.2% 61.3% 78.7% 80.1% 74.6%
∆NT 0.0% -7.6% -14.4% -15.1% -16.9% -15.7% -12.3% -11.9% -15.5% 5.2%
∆T 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -1.7% -0.6% -1.4%
∆X 5.1% 9.7% 1.3% 0.3% 1.8% -0.1% -4.7% -21.1% -20.1% -19.1%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 100.0% 82.5% 65.7% 59.9% 55.5% 49.2% 42.0% 35.0% 29.0% 23.5%
% CS Pre-School and Elementary Teachers 100.0% 99.9% 98.4% 97.0% 95.0% 92.4% 88.3% 77.8% 71.3% 61.8%
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 10.0%
∆0 -0.1% 6.2% 39.0% 38.5% 38.8% 41.9% 46.2% 53.6% 62.6% 51.8%
∆NT 0.0% -4.3% -23.2% -30.6% -33.6% -35.9% -34.9% -28.9% -34.4% -18.8%
∆T 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% 0.3% -0.6% -0.7% -2.1% -1.1% -6.2%
∆X 1.3% -0.4% -14.3% -6.5% -4.3% -4.1% -9.3% -21.3% -25.7% -16.7%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 100.0% 86.3% 54.0% 44.2% 39.9% 34.1% 27.7% 22.1% 17.4% 13.5%
% CS Secondary Teachers 100.0% 99.8% 98.8% 97.7% 95.1% 92.2% 87.8% 77.3% 69.3% 60.4%  
Source: National household surveys 
* Mexico not considered. Unexplained earnings gaps for the full set were 75.6% for all teachers, 80.1% for pre-school and primary teachers, and 64.7% for secondary teachers.  
 
 
In Figure 1, we report confidence intervals for the unexplained earnings gap between teachers and 
non-teachers for our different specifications.  14 
 
Figure 1 
Unexplained Earnings for Different Specifications for School 
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Table 6 presents the four components of the earnings gap decomposition using the full set of 
control variables by country for average teachers, pre-school and elementary school teachers, and 
for  secondary  school  teachers,  respectively  vis-à-vis  other  professionals  and  technicians,  and 
provides evidence of notable cross-country heterogeneity behind the region averages reported in 
Table 3
4. For two of the three specifications Nicaragua’s unexplained earnings gap is the widest. 
Mexico’s  unexplained  gap  is  the  widest  if  considering  only  pre-school  and  primary  teachers. 
However this result must be considered with care due to the small common support. Interestingly, 
although Mexico, Honduras and El Salvador show negative original earnings gaps, suggesting that 
school teachers earn more than other professionals and technicians, after controlling for the full 
set  of  observable  characteristics  the  earnings  gap  goes  from  negative  to  positive.  Only  for 
secondary  teachers  the  unexplained  earnings  gap  remains  negative  in  Mexico.  Even  more 
interestingly, in Chile the school teacher’s earnings gap is smaller after controlling for the full set 
of characteristics than the original gap. This last result seems to be driven by pre-school and 
primary teachers.     
Table 6 





Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panamá Uruguay
School Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 50.4% 27.4% 6.5% -4.8% -20.2% -21.6% 89.4% 9.5% 21.8%
∆0 81.7% 13.8% 36.9% 6.2% 20.3% 12.3% 87.7% 23.6% 24.4%
∆NT -5.0% -3.8% -13.2% -4.1% -13.3% -11.0% -22.2% -13.5% 2.3%
∆T -0.3% 2.2% -19.3% -13.0% -18.0% -10.2% 4.1% -0.5% -5.4%
∆X -25.9% 15.2% 2.1% 6.0% -9.2% -12.7% 19.7% -0.1% 0.5%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 44.0% 39.6% 21.6% 11.1% 13.5% 2.0% 11.6% 16.5% 9.6%
% CS All School Teachers 79.3% 75.1% 28.9% 18.4% 26.1% 35.7% 13.1% 44.5% 24.8%
Pre-school and Elementary Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 66.6% 35.6% 17.2% -6.0% -19.8% -18.7% 96.6% 19.6% 25.7%
∆0 87.0% 15.3% 33.9% 5.2% 8.2% 91.3% 89.7% 32.8% 22.8%
∆NT 2.6% 1.1% -9.0% -6.1% -2.2% -79.1% -9.7% -17.6% 8.1%
∆T 0.6% 1.0% -20.1% -13.1% -17.6% -3.0% 6.7% -0.4% -3.8%
∆X -23.6% 18.2% 12.3% 8.0% -8.3% -27.9% 9.9% 4.8% -1.4%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 39.2% 35.0% 16.1% 9.4% 10.3% 0.4% 10.0% 11.1% 5.0%
% CS Pre-School and Elementary Teachers 78.9% 76.3% 28.0% 17.8% 25.2% 29.5% 11.5% 45.4% 23.5%
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other Professionals and Technicians
∆ 10.1% 5.3% -10.2% 7.0% -21.6% -23.1% 59.1% -4.1% 16.9%
∆0 68.2% 9.8% 40.7% 13.9% 55.7% -17.6% 76.8% 10.6% 26.0%
∆NT -21.9% -22.0% -24.8% 10.2% -45.7% 3.9% -41.8% -14.1% -0.4%
∆T -2.9% 7.0% -19.3% -9.4% -19.6% -13.4% -9.6% 0.0% -7.6%
∆X -33.3% 10.5% -6.8% -7.7% -12.0% 3.9% 33.7% -0.7% -1.1%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 24.1% 13.1% 8.5% 1.7% 4.2% 1.6% 2.8% 8.7% 5.7%
% CS Secondary Teachers 80.8% 71.0% 30.8% 23.5% 29.2% 39.0% 21.6% 42.8% 26.6%  
Source: National household surveys 
 
                                                           
4 Confidence intervals by country can be found on Figure A1 of the appendix. 16 
 
3.2 Distribution of the Unexplained Earnings Gap 
An advantage of the matching approach over the traditional regression-based decompositions is 
that it is informative not only about the average unexplained gap but also about its distribution. 
The  following  analysis  report  confidence  intervals  for  the  unexplained  earnings  gap  between 
teachers and non-teachers by different characteristics, after controlling for all demographic and 
job-related characteristics. It provides further evidence of the heterogeneity of the unexplained 
component of the earnings gap. In general, teachers’ underpayment is more pronounced among 
males,  older  workers,  those  with  complete  tertiary  education,  household  heads,  part-timers, 
formal workers and seemingly for those who work in the private sector. Distributions also suggest 
that having a family life might come at a cost in income, especially raising kids. 17 
 
Figure 2 
Confidence Intervals for the Unexplained Earnings Gap by Different Characteristics for 
All Teachers versus Other Professional and Technicians  





















































































































































































































No kids at home Kid(s) at kome
CI(90%) CI(99%)



















































No elders at home Elder(s) at home
CI(90%) CI(99%)







































































































One wage earner at home Oth. wage earner
CI(90%) CI(99%)































































































































































Public Sector Private Sector
CI(90%) CI(99%)




Confidence Intervals for the Unexplained Earnings Gap by Different Characteristics for 
Pre-School and Elementary School Teachers versus Other Professionals and Technicians 
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Confidence Intervals for the Unexplained Earnings Gap by Different Characteristics for 
Secondary School Teachers versus Other Professionals and Technicians  
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The distributions of income disparities are far from homogeneous throughout the conditional 
hourly earnings distribution. Figure 5 shows that, when considering the full set of observable 
variables, there are no major differences in hourly earnings between teachers and professional 
and technicians for the first percentiles of the distribution. On the other hand, there are major 
differences in favor of teachers when considering the original earnings gap. However, in both 
cases, it is at the top of the distribution of hourly earnings that the highest differences are found. 
The typical teacher who is in the upper part of the earnings distribution faces an income penalty 




Unexplained Earnings Gap between Teachers and 
Other Professionals and Technicians along percentiles 



















































































































Original Gap Full Set  
 
Figure 6 presents a similar analysis to the one in Figure 5 for those teachers in pre-school and 
primary school levels compared with other professionals and technicians. The Figure shows a 
similar result to the one obtained for all teachers; it presents evidence that the earnings gap in the 
bottom percentiles of the distribution do not considerably contribute to the aggregate measure of 
unexplained earnings differences between teachers and other professionals and technicians; the 
average earnings gap in Latin America is driven by pay differences at the top percentiles of the 
earnings distribution. 
 
                                                           
5 It is important to highlight the fact that the results below must be interpreted carefully. Results in the bottom five 
percentiles, as well in the upper five percentiles, are not robust. For that reason, the unexplained earnings gap along 
percentiles of the earnings distribution must be interpreted after the percentile 5 and before the percentile 95. 21 
 
Figure 6 
Unexplained Earnings Gap between Pre-School and Elementary 
Teachers and Other Professionals and Technicians along percentiles of 























































































































Original Gap Full Set  
 
Figure 7 presents the analysis for those teachers in secondary school level compared with other 
professionals and technicians. The Figure presents evidence of a negative earnings gap in the 
bottom percentiles of the distribution. When considering the full set of variables, up to the 22
th 
percentile secondary school teachers earn a premium, however, teachers who are in the upper 
part of the conditional earnings distribution face an income penalty, especially when considering 
the full set. 
Figure 7 
Unexplained Earnings Gap between Secondary Teachers and Other Professionals 






















































































































Original Gap Full Set  22 
 
These  results  show  that  there  are  important  differences  along  the  earnings  distribution.  In 
general,  teachers  in  the  highest  percentiles  of  the  earnings  distribution  earn  less  than  other 
professionals  and  technicians,  while  teachers  in  the  bottom  percentiles  tend  to  have  similar 
earnings than comparable workers, moreover, in the case of secondary school teachers those who 
are in the bottom percentiles of the distribution earns a premium. In other words, the average 
earnings  gap  between  teachers  and  comparable  workers  in  Latin  America  are  driven  by  pay 
differences at the top percentiles of the earnings distribution; this can be explained by the fact 
that in many countries teachers are rewarded trough a single salary schedule which implies a 
salary structure much more compressed than the one of other professionals and technicians.  
 
3.3 Exploring some amenities of the teaching profession and their role on the earnings gaps: 
schedules and tenure. 
Typical policy discussions about the choice of a teaching career highlight the extra amenities that 
come with a teaching job. Two of the most salient of those amenities are the shorter (and flexible) 
job schedule, on the one hand, and the more stability that the profession enjoys, on the other. As 
it is typical in economics, these extra amenities have to come at a price. In this case such price 
would be expressed in term of earnings disparities between teachers and their peers. Next, we 
make an attempt to explore the extent to which these two amenities are linked to the earnings 
gaps. 
First we assess the role of job schedules on the earnings gaps. For this we will look into the pay 
differences  reported  for  hourly  earnings  adjusted  by  job-break  periods  (or  vacations).  These 
adjusted hourly earnings are the hourly earnings prorated according to the following: for teachers, 
we assume a two-month paid vacation period so that teachers earnings are multiplied by the 
12/10 ratio; for non-teaching dependant workers, we assume a one-month paid vacation period 
so that related earnings are multiplied by the 12/11 ratio; and we assume no paid vacations for 
independent workers (that is, adjusted hourly earnings in this case are the same as non-adjusted). 
The ratio numerator corresponds to the months of a year (12): that is, the number of times a 
worker earns a salary in a year. The ratio denominator corresponds to the number of month that a 
worker actually works according to our assumptions. Then, the prorated hourly earnings are linear 
transformation of the non-adjusted hourly earnings, and a measure of the relative hourly earnings 
when job-periods are accounted for.  As before, for the remaining stages of our analysis these 
earnings  are  measured  in  terms  of  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP,  US$,  2000),  and  average 
teachers’ (adjusted) earnings have been set equal to 100 for each country.  
Tables 7  presents the earnings gap decompositions for prorated (adjusted) hourly earnings for 
average teachers, pre-school and elementary school teachers, and for secondary school teachers, 
respectively vis-à-vis other professionals and technicians. The table reports that the earnings gap 
computed for prorated hourly earnings is much smaller than that of non-adjusted hourly earnings: 
the unexplained earnings gap for pre-school teachers is 15% smaller; secondary teachers’ is 10% 23 
 
smaller; overall earnings gap is 14% smaller. The previous result indicates that not considering job-
break periods (vacations) can lead to overestimate the earnings gap. 
 
Table 7 
Earnings Decompositions for prorated hourly earnings 
 
∆ 17.4% 28.8% -9.5%
∆0 57.2% 61.8% 46.2%
∆NT -19.0% -14.8% -31.7%
∆T -0.9% -0.6% -1.1%
∆X -19.9% -17.7% -22.8%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 33.1% 29.0% 17.4%
% CS Teachers 70.8% 71.3% 69.3%
Decompositions Using the "Full Set" of Observable Characteristics
School Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
Pre-School and Elementary Teachers 
vis-à-vis Other Professionals and 
Technicians
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
 
Source: National household surveys 
 
So far we have considered hourly earnings as these are more accurate estimates of what a worker 
truly earns (earnings per unit of time working).  But, do the previous results hold even if we 
consider monthly earnings and yearly earnings (the equivalent of prorated hourly earnings)? We 
address this question next. 
Monthly earnings correspond to the monthly income received from the main occupation in the 
month previous to the survey. Yearly earnings are computed with the same procedure used to 
compute prorated earnings, but multiplying these “prorated monthly earnings” by 12. Outliers 
were  dropped  out,  this  comprised  0.07%  of  teachers  and  1.15%  of  other  professionals  and 
technicians.  The  results  in  Table  8  show  that,  after  considering  the  full  set  of  observable 
characteristics, using monthly and yearly earnings leads to and overestimation of the original 
earnings  gap,  as  well  the  unexplained  earnings  gap.  Interestingly,  adding  part-time  work  is 
negatively related to the earnings gap (not shown), which is the cost of not considering earnings 
per unit of time working (or hourly earnings). Once more, considering job break periods leads to 













Earnings Decompositions for Monthly and Yearly Earnings 
 
Monthly earnings
∆ 64.6% 79.4% 28.8%
∆0 75.6% 79.6% 66.2%
∆NT -31.0% -25.3% -52.0%
∆T 5.1% 4.9% 6.4%
∆X 14.8% 20.2% 8.1%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 33.1% 29.0% 17.4%
% CS Teachers 70.7% 71.2% 69.1%
Yearly earnings
∆ 47.5% 60.7% 15.4%
∆0 57.6% 61.3% 48.9%
∆NT -28.7% -23.7% -47.4%
∆T 5.1% 4.9% 6.4%
∆X 13.4% 18.3% 7.5%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 33.1% 29.0% 17.4%
% CS Teachers 70.7% 71.2% 69.1%
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
Pre-School and Elementary Teachers 
vis-à-vis Other Professionals and 
Technicians
School Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
Decompositions Using the "Full Set" of Observable Characteristics
 
Source: National household surveys 
 
In what follows, we assess the role of job tenure, which is claimed to be longer among teachers. 
Unfortunately such information on job tenure is available only in six out of the nine surveys, those 
of:  Brazil,  Chile,  Ecuador,  Nicaragua,  Panama  and  Uruguay.  Table  9  presents  the  number  of 
observations for both, the working sample and the population groups considered so far. Outliers 
for income are dropped once more
6. The new (more restricted) data set contains 73% of the data 
previously considered; 93.5% of the teachers’ group sample and 76.7% of the non-teachers’ group 
sample (that is, other professionals and technicians). Earnings are computed as before for both, 
adjusted and non-adjusted hourly earnings. Average school teachers’ earnings have been set equal 
to 100 for each country for both, adjusted and non-adjusted hourly earnings. We start exploring 







                                                           
6 This comprised 0.3% of school teachers, 0.2% of office workers and 1.5% of other professionals and technicians. 25 
 
Table 9 
Samples Size and Average Earnings, by Group 
 
Number of Expanded Number of Expanded Number of Expanded Number of Expanded
observations observations observations observations observations observations observations observations
Brazil 157775 76800000 3829 1870619 1055 494701 19798 9647079
Chile 81463 5918783 1495 109033 275 31767 8429 1015545
Ecuador 9147 2404002 522 115693 254 56255 1093 293211
Nicaragua 11024 1652432 377 48401 64 9292 592 118800
Panamá 18842 1269300 395 24953 220 14764 1702 131078
Uruguay 25432 532842 592 12238 418 9023 2841 61053
All countries 303683 88577359 7210 2180937 2286 615802 34455 11266766
Other Professionals and Technicians/Teachers (non tertiary) Working Populations for the "Job tenure" Subsample*








* Working populations in each country are identified as those earning a salary in the main occupation 
 
Figure 8 presents the Kernel density estimation of job tenure with a 2 bandwidth (the smoothing 
factor) for the population groups of our analysis, which consists in a non-parametric estimation of 
probability density function of the job tenure variable. The left panel of the figure shows that 
teachers are more tenured along the distribution until the 35
th year of job tenure, after which 
there are no differences between teachers and their peers. 42% of teachers show between 0 and 5 
years of tenure, while such percentage for office workers and other professionals and technicians 
are 72% and 57% respectively. At the other extreme of the distribution, 19% of teachers show 20 
or more years of tenure while such percentage for office workers and other professionals and 
technicians are 8% and 12.7% respectively. 
More interesting results emerge if private and public sector workers are compared sepparately. It 
is believed that there is greater job estability for professionals and technicians in the public sector, 
especially among teachers. In fact, professionals and technicians are more tenured in the public 
sector than in the private sector. The right panel of Figure 8 shwos that 35.3% of public sector 
school teachers show between 0 and 5 years of tenure, while 63.9% of private sector school 
teachers show so; 43.9% of the other professionals an technicians who work in the public sector 
school show between 0 and 5 years of tenure, while 61.6% of private sector’s other professionals 
and technicians show. On the other hand, 23.6% of public sector school teachers show 20 or more 
years of tenure, while only 6.4% of private school teachers show so; regarding other professionals 
and technicians, such magnitudes are 21.7% and 9.5%, respectively. Additionally, when looking at 
average tenure (not reported, but available from authors upon request) school teachers have an 
average of 11 years of tenure in the public sector and other professionals and technicians 10.5 
years, while in the private sector this averages are 6 and 7 year respectively. This in turn suggest 
that tenure is a differentiating factor between teachers and the comparision groups, especially in 
the public.     26 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 presents a Kernel regression performed on the data set: the Y’s, the dependent variable, 
being the hourly earnings and the X’s, the independent variable, being the tenure years in the job. 
The Kernel regression consists in a non-parametric estimation of the conditional expectation of 
the Y’s, conditioned to the X’s, so that we find a non-linear relation between hourly earnings and 
the job tenure variable. 
Figure 9 shows that not only other professional and technicians earn more than teachers, but also 
the earnings gaps between these two groups increases with tenure. The returns to tenure are 
lower for teachers. However, the earnings gap persists for teachers vis-à-vis other professionals 
and technicians. Teachers’ earnings in the private sector are much volatile than in the public 
sector,  especially  for  those  with  longer  tenure.  Nontheless,  the  non-parametric  regressions 
relating job tenure and earnings are qualitatively similar for the public and private sector. These 
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Next,  continuing  with  our  analysis  on  job  tenure,  Table  10  presents  the  earnings  gaps 
decompositions  for  average  teachers,  pre-school  and  elementary  school  teachers,  and  for 
secondary school teachers, respectively vis-à-vis other professionals and technicians using the 
more restricted job-tenure data subset. The results show that working in the public sector reduces 
the earnings gap in 8% between teachers vis-à-vis other professionals and technicians; that is, a 
decrease of 6% in the earnings gap regarding primary and preschool teachers and of almost 13% 
regarding secondary teachers. Results also show that job tenure is indeed a variable that explains 
the earnings gap. Adding job tenure as a control variable reduces the earnings gap in almost 19% 
for the group of average teachers; in 17.4% for pre-school and elementary teachers; in nearly 
22.6% for secondary teachers. 
 
Regarding prorated hourly earnings:  adding working in the public sector as a control variable 
reduces the earnings gap in 6% for the group of average teachers; in 4.2% for pre-school and 
elementary teachers; in 10.2% for secondary teachers; adding job tenure reduces the earnings gap 


















Earnings Gap Decompositions  





+ Job Tenure Full Set
+ Public 
Sector





∆ 47.0% 47.0% 47.0% 62.0% 62.0% 62.0% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6%
∆0 76.5% 68.5% 49.7% 81.4% 75.5% 58.1% 64.7% 51.8% 29.2%
∆NT -5.9% -0.4% 27.2% 1.3% 7.0% 33.1% -23.6% -17.5% 13.0%
∆T -0.6% -2.8% -10.7% 0.0% -0.9% -9.4% -1.8% -6.7% -13.2%
∆X -23.0% -18.3% -19.2% -20.7% -19.5% -19.8% -28.7% -17.0% -18.5%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 42.2% 29.1% 6.8% 37.4% 24.0% 5.4% 22.2% 13.9% 2.0%
% CS Teachers 73.7% 63.5% 18.7% 73.9% 63.9% 18.9% 73.1% 61.8% 18.1%
Adjusted hourly earnings
∆ 31.3% 31.3% 31.3% 44.8% 44.8% 44.8% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2%
∆0 58.6% 52.7% 36.2% 63.0% 58.8% 43.6% 48.1% 37.9% 18.0%
∆NT -6.3% -1.6% 23.1% 0.0% 4.9% 28.4% -22.0% -17.0% 10.6%
∆T -0.6% -2.8% -10.7% 0.0% -0.9% -9.4% -1.8% -6.7% -13.2%
∆X -20.4% -17.0% -17.4% -18.2% -18.0% -17.9% -25.5% -15.4% -16.6%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 42.2% 29.1% 6.8% 37.4% 24.0% 5.4% 22.2% 13.9% 2.0%
% CS Teachers 73.7% 63.5% 18.7% 73.9% 63.9% 18.9% 73.1% 61.8% 18.1%
School Teachers versus Professionals vis-à-
vis Other Professionals and Technicians
Pre-School and Elementary Teachers vis-à-
vis Other Professionals and Technicians
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
 
Source: National household surveys 
 
Using monthly and yearly earnings we obtain similar results (Table 11). Job tenure does explain the 
earnings gap, the same after considering public sector as a control variable. However, in this case 
the effect of public sector in the earnings gap is negligible for pre-school and primary teachers. In 
general, the results are pretty much the same. 
 
Table 11 
Earnings Gap Decompositions for Monthly and Yearly Earnings  





+ Job Tenure Full Set
+ Public 
Sector





∆ 79.1% 79.1% 79.1% 95.9% 95.9% 95.9% 37.4% 37.4% 37.4%
∆0 76.8% 74.7% 58.1% 80.6% 80.1% 63.3% 67.6% 61.5% 45.1%
∆NT -18.1% -7.8% 34.4% -10.2% 3.3% 44.2% -41.9% -32.0% 11.6%
∆T 5.2% 6.2% 2.9% 5.2% 7.0% 3.4% 5.5% 5.0% 2.6%
∆X 15.1% 6.0% -16.3% 20.3% 5.4% -15.0% 6.1% 3.0% -21.9%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 42.1% 29.1% 6.8% 37.3% 24.0% 5.4% 22.1% 13.8% 2.0%
% CS Teachers 73.6% 63.4% 18.7% 73.8% 63.9% 18.8% 73.0% 61.7% 18.1%
Yearly earnings
∆ 60.4% 60.4% 60.4% 75.4% 75.4% 75.4% 23.1% 23.1% 23.1%
∆0 58.7% 57.7% 42.7% 62.1% 62.6% 47.4% 50.2% 45.7% 30.7%
∆NT -17.2% -8.4% 29.5% -10.4% 1.4% 38.2% -38.4% -30.2% 9.2%
∆T 5.2% 6.2% 2.9% 5.2% 7.0% 3.4% 5.5% 5.0% 2.6%
∆X 13.7% 4.9% -14.7% 18.4% 4.4% -13.6% 5.7% 2.5% -19.5%
% CS Other Professionals and Technicians 42.1% 29.1% 6.8% 37.3% 24.0% 5.4% 22.1% 13.8% 2.0%
% CS Teachers 73.6% 63.4% 18.7% 73.8% 63.9% 18.8% 73.0% 61.7% 18.1%
School Teachers versus Professionals vis-à-
vis Other Professionals and Technicians
Secondary Teachers vis-à-vis Other 
Professionals and Technicians
Pre-School and Elementary Teachers vis-à-
vis Other Professionals and Technicians
 





This paper examines whether teachers’ salaries in Latin America are similar to those of other 
professionals and technicians. Since the available empirical evidence has shown that the sign and 
magnitude of the conditional earnings differential between teachers and other workers depend 
crucially on the definition of the comparison group, we use the methodology developed in Ñopo 
(2008).  This  approach  emphasizes  earnings  differences  in  the  supports of  the  distributions of 
observable  characteristics  and  provides  insights  into  the  distribution  of  unexplained  pay 
differences.  
The results show that teachers are underpaid in Latin America; even though, behind the region 
averages there is an important cross-country heterogeneity. Teachers are more educated than 
other professionals and technicians but their years of education are not rewarded in the labor 
market, in fact, higher education has a penalty in the top percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
Also part-time work is a job characteristic that to a large extend explains teachers’ underpayment, 
mainly for pre-school and elementary school teachers. Moreover, job tenure and job schedules do 
have  an  important  role  in  explaining  the earnings  gap:  the  first  is  positively  related with the 
earnings gap, and the second states that not considering job-brake periods (vacations) may lead to 
overestimate the earnings gap. This could be explained as some sort of compensating differential, 
that is, the amenity of part-time schedules, larger vacations periods and more job stability (that in 
many circumstances is used as a way of managing the family-work trade-off) are compensating 
with lower earnings. It could be hypothesized that those individuals with prospects of raising a 
family,  with  the  desire  of  devoting  time  to  it  opt  for  the  teaching  profession,  accepting  the 
possibility of lower earnings. But this would require further exploration. 
Working in the public sector appears to have explanatory power, as is negatively related to the 
earnings gap. However, looking at monthly and yearly earnings, these results do not hold for pre-
school  and  primary  teachers.  Anyway,  as  results  are  not  conclusive  we  encourage  further 
exploration regarding this issue.  
The analysis performed provides evidence of the heterogeneity of the unexplained component of 
the earnings gap. In general, teachers’ underpayment is more pronounced among males, older 
workers, those more educated (with tertiary education complete), urban, part-timers, and formal 
workers.  Moreover, important differences along the earnings distribution were found. In general, 
teachers in the highest percentiles of the earnings distribution earn less than other professionals 
and technicians, while teachers in the bottom percentiles tend to have similar or higher earnings 
than  comparable workers.  Thus,  the  average  earnings  gap  between  teachers  and  comparable 
workers  in  Latin  America  is  driven  by  pay  differences  at  the  top  percentiles  of  the  earnings 
distribution. This can be explained because in many countries teachers are rewarded trough a 
single salary schedule which implies a salary structure much more compressed than the one of 
other professionals and technicians.  30 
 
This salary structure is appealing to teachers as a fair way to compensate everyone, because it 
does not make distinctions that might disturb relationships among them. In this scheme equal pay 
is  provided  regardless of differing  efforts  and  abilities;  salaries  are  unrelated  to  the  activities 
performed at the schools; being seniority and the level of education the primary basis for any pay 
increase, which means that in the teaching profession loyalty rather than actual job performance 
is rewarded.  
This system implies that teaching probably attracts people with a preference for job stability and 
security, and at the same time equal pay regardless of performance penalizes the highly effective 
teachers who should be earning more. Thus, the single salary schedule might not be attractive to 
high performing teachers. For this reason, several countries are reforming traditional systems of 
recruiting teachers as well as mechanisms of paying and rewarding them, in order to attract and 
retain highly qualified individuals into teaching, and to get teachers to work hard to raise student 
learning (OECD, 2009).   31 
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Unexplained Earnings by country using the full set of observable characteristics for 
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